Football history repeats itself a lot, especially as farce, which was particularly true of goalkeepers this week. Take a story from one of the vintage English Champions League ties, in Manchester United’s famous quarter-final against Real Madrid in 2002–03. Everyone wanted to talk about Ronaldo’s hat-trick afterwards, which was what one golfer apparently tried to do on seeing Sir Alex Ferguson play a round. The United manager’s great’s response? “Yeah, but what about the goalie?”
Apocryphal or exaggerated as such stories may be, Ferguson did jettison Fabian Barthez the very next window: summer 2003.
Many Premier League coaches might have felt the same over the past few days – “what about the goalie?” – except they had just picked them, in huge decisions.
Igor Tudor and poor Antonin Kinsky set an unfortunate theme, picked up by Rosenior and Filip Jorgensen, and surprisingly perpetuated by Gigi Donnarumma. The Italian, widely seen within the game as a “Robin van Persie signing” from Pep Guardiola in terms of specifically buying a player to win now, had some bad moments in that defeat to Real Madrid.
The repercussions – and they’re not necessarily all negative – are likely to go way beyond the Champions League. They may influence relegation, the title race and who actually gets back into the competition.
The obvious importance of your goalkeeper has always occupied an odd place in football, since there are many coaches who privately admit that this most exposed of positions is the one they understand the least. Some of the greatest managers are notorious for having blind spots about goalkeepers. And that is logical. Look how few goalkeepers become managers. The position has long been seen as something separate from the rest of football, a different aspect of the game.
Their increased integration into general play, however, is part of the issue here.
Rosenior naturally offered a strong defence of Jorgensen after the Paris Saint-Germain defeat, and there was more to it than just protecting his player. There was also more to his insistence that “that’s on me”.
Rosenior backed Jorgensen in that way because the risky pass that gifted Vitinha PSG’s crucial third goal was a specific coaching instruction. It is exactly the ball Chelsea are being coached to play. And that is indeed about risk–reward.
Everyone, of course, saw Bradley Barcola intercept the ball, but perhaps less noticed was how Chelsea would have been through had the PSG attacker not quite got across. The press would have been broken, exactly as Rosenior’s coaching staff had been planning.
It was that kind of game. It’s now that kind of sport.
The Jorgensen decision obviously took on an extra dimension due to what happened with Kinsky the night before. A rival English club had made a big goalkeeping call and it had backfired in the worst way imaginable. We had the astonishing sight of a keeper being subbed off after 17 minutes, having been culpable for two goals in a 3–0 deficit.
Knowing how people in football talk about how a psychological “contagion” can spread in such weeks – in other words, key events are in players’ minds – there was obviously some extra risk. You would have forgiven Jorgensen for considering it.
The nature of the two selection decisions was very different, though. Inside Football understands that Rosenior had naturally told Jorgensen he was starting on the day before Chelsea’s game, so before the Spurs match, having apparently thought about it for a long time.
There was much more abruptness with Kinsky, as has become typical during Tudor’s brief time at Spurs. While Guglielmo Vicario has been on poor form, and there have long been questions about his kicking, the 22-year-old Kinsky hasn’t fully adapted since a good early performance against Liverpool soon after signing. Some at Spurs feel the young Czech is a confidence player. He maybe could have done with a steadier build-up to such a huge game, especially with everything going on around the club.
That confidence was instead immediately dented.
It is worth acknowledging, however, that it wasn’t totally his fault. Both major errors were slips, which other players also endured on that same pitch. It’s really misfortune rather than outright mistakes.
Either way, Tudor displayed more abruptness, and that is now only deepening the major problems Spurs already have. Many of the players are confused by the tactical plans and don’t like the way he speaks to them.
This was then compounded by how he didn’t speak to Kinsky at all after hauling him off.
Rosenior’s decision was more measured, and is specifically based on the type of passes he wants.
That is illustrated by how Robert Sanchez was repeatedly trying the same balls in a similarly testing fixture away to Arsenal – only to get caught a few times. The susceptibility to that pressing conditioned much of the match.
So, for a comparable challenge against PSG, Rosenior acted. Such decisions have been a theme of his own career. All three of his senior jobs have involved major calls favouring possession-adept goalkeepers.
Rosenior is described as taking a particularly keen interest in data on the position, and he has liked Jorgensen’s patterns. It is why the Swede is now expected to stay as number one for this season, before Mike Penders comes in.
Through that, Rosenior is arguably just taking a long-term tactical trend to its logical next stage. Premier League leaders Arsenal made a similar decision three years ago, as Mikel Arteta went for David Raya over Aaron Ramsdale because of specific passes he could execute.
Arsenal did also think Raya was a better pure goalkeeper, which is not quite the case with Jorgensen and Sanchez. Chelsea apparently see no real difference in their ability to make saves.
It shows how Rosenior is even more granular on this, seeking to make the goalkeeper even more integrated.
The whole point is to ensure they are no longer a position apart, that they become a proper 11th man. Coaches like Rosenior and Arteta actively want them to bait the press and play just like a midfielder would. It’s risky, yes, but such coaches now take it as a given that the reward – the coherence of your team – is much, much greater, so much so that it is barely worth weighing it up. It’s obvious.
On that, it’s amusing now to think of the furore when the high priest of this entire principle – Guardiola – replaced Joe Hart with Claudio Bravo. The Chilean’s errors were almost treated as morality plays.
Now, they’re all priced in.
A final irony is that the high priest has gone in the opposite direction. Donnarumma has largely been brought in for his old-fashioned assurance.
Again, full circle, history repeating itself – but precisely to try to create a new force rather than farce.
